The US’s Venezuela strategy could ripple across the region

Washington has sent destroyers to the Venezuelan coast. Caracas has mobilized millions of militiamen. Both Trump and Maduro are playing with fire

The United States has deployed three Aegis guided-missile destroyers off the coast of Venezuela as part of an operation driven by Donald Trump aimed at countering threats posed by Latin American drug cartels. 

These ships are joined by at least 4,000 troops — including 2,200 United States Marine Corps personnel — as well as P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft and a submarine. Together, they form a small task force with amphibious capabilities.

The operation has already led to the destruction of a boat that, according to U.S. authorities, was carrying members of the Tren de Aragua criminal group, killing 11 people. A few days later, the U.S. announced the destruction of a second vessel with suspected Venezuelan drug traffickers, and on September 16 reported a third similar attack — further heightening tensions between the two countries. 

Legal experts have noted that these lethal strikes by the Trump administration against suspected smuggling boats raise complex and significant legal questions.

Beyond legal concerns, these actions could simply be interpreted as part of a U.S. naval offensive against international drug trafficking. However, on closer inspection, the U.S. appears to be pursuing a specific fugitive drug trafficker whose capture has become a top priority.

Nicolás Maduro, the “president of Venezuela,” has been accused by the U.S. since March 26, 2020, of being an international drug trafficker. A US$15 million reward was initially offered for information leading to his arrest, a figure raised to US$50 million in August 2025. Such sums could spark ambitions even within Mr. Maduro’s inner circle. It cannot be ruled out that someone might ultimately betray him, luring him toward the coast, where a U.S. patrol could simply seize him.

It is clear that Mr. Maduro would not be mourned by the vast majority of Venezuelans who have had to flee the country over the past two decades, nor by a significant portion of those who remain. How many Venezuelans still support Maduro? It is difficult to estimate, but polls suggest support fluctuates between 12.5% and 25%. Yet it is important to distinguish between electoral support and how the population might react in the face of a foreign military attack or intervention.

Hybrid war in Venezuela?

Hybrid warfare is a form of conflict that combines various means — military, economic, technological, and informational — to weaken, destabilize, or defeat an adversary. It typically mixes conventional military actions, irregular operations (such as the use of militias), cyberattacks and disinformation, economic pressure (like trade sanctions), and psychological operations (for example, sowing confusion or internal divisions). 

The concept was theorized in 2007 by Frank Hoffman, but in practice, most wars have always had a hybrid dimension.

For about two decades, the U.S. has imposed a series of escalating sanctions on Venezuela, ranging from bans on arms sales, asset freezes, and visa bans on regime figures, to cutting access to U.S. financial markets, sanctions on the state-owned oil company PDVSA and the Central Bank of Venezuela, and the imposition of a 25% tariff on Venezuelan oil purchased by third countries. Similarly, since 2017, the European Union and other countries have imposed an arms embargo, asset freezes, and travel restrictions on Venezuelan officials — measures that have even been expanded this year.

The problem is that Maduro’s government remains in power, and an unpredictable Donald Trump might be tempted to consider military intervention in Venezuela, not only to “solve” the problem but also to demonstrate American power.

Ripple effects

Latin America, a region historically under U.S. influence, has never been unconditionally aligned with Washington. Trump’s erratic foreign and trade policies are producing ripple effects not just in China and Europe, but across several Latin American nations as well.

In Colombia, for example, leftist President Gustavo Petro, a fierce critic of Trump’s policies, has refused to extradite three guerrilla leaders sought by the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. Revelations have also surfaced about an alleged coup plot in which members of the United States Congress were allegedly mentioned. 

In Mexico, the government of Claudia Sheinbaum is striving to maintain diplomatic balance in the face of U.S. statements about a possible military intervention against drug trafficking, while also managing tensions over tariffs and migration.

The Venezuelan problem demands a solution, but in the current geopolitical context, military intervention could destabilize an entire region where the U.S. likely has more to lose than to gain.

It is undeniable that, before the international community, Washington does not need to invoke an alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction to justify an intervention in Venezuela. The police pursuit of a head of state under investigation by the International Criminal Court for human rights violations — charges supported by Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay — could suffice, provided there is solid evidence and the accused is actually brought before that international court. But let us not forget: the U.S. does not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction and has even imposed sanctions against it. So…

The Panamanian precedent

A police and military operation aimed at capturing a drug trafficker and bringing him before a U.S. judge might seem logical, at least to some members of the Trump administration, and could also serve as a show of force. The problem is that this pretext has been used before by a U.S. administration, stirring painful memories.

Without comparing the incomparable, one need only recall that Manuel Noriega, the Panamanian dictator accused of drug trafficking by the U.S., was arrested during Operation Just Cause in 1989 — an intervention that left between 300 and 800 dead, depending on the source. At the Panama Canal Museum in Panama City, which I recently visited, visitors are told that the name of the operation translates into Spanish as “Causa Justa,” though the museum also notes, more ironically, that it can be read as “Just because.”

Today, Nicolás Maduro has mobilized 4.5 million militiamen to confront the American threat.

By playing with such explosive strategies, Washington, D.C. and Caracas risk triggering unpredictable consequences in Venezuela — and across the entire region.

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