Marcelo Falak 
The violent invasion of the headquarters of the three powers in Brasilia by thousands of far-right supporters –only a week into Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s third government–, caught security forces strikingly off guard, especially state military police and the Army. Indeed, evicting the camps set up near several important military bases to demand a military coup – especially the one in the country’s capital– was considered a priority even before the left-wing leader took office. Time went by, the task was not accomplished, and that militant core turned into the seed of a full-frontal challenge to democracy. The head of state called for the intervention of the Federal District and put a harsh spotlight on the troops that, for some reason, did not prevent the disaster.
It’s inevitably obvious to point out that what happened echoes the assault on the Capitol in Washington by a Donald Trump-addicted mob on January 6, 2021. The script of the events that are stirring up Brazil was indeed written back then by the former Republican president, although some differences –especially in context– shed light on the intentions of the violent crowd we saw today.
The storylines of both situations are carbon copies of each other: Trump and Jair Bolsonaro’s defeats were –allegedly– caused by electoral fraud set up by the respective judicial, media and political establishments for the benefit of “the left” –or even “communism”– embodied by Joe Biden and Lula da Silva. However, while in the United States the crowd demanded that Congress not certify the result of the elections, what happened in Brazil was yet another episode in the attempt to create a social commotion that would “force” the Armed Forces to intervene through a coup like the one in 1964, and even return Lula da Silva to jail.
Intentions
The intention was explicit on the slogans featured at the camps, which were tolerated by local police and the Army – as they have jurisdiction over the land adjacent to their barracks– for reasons still unclear, either an unwillingness to repress, or sheer complicity.
In addition, this goal was confessed by Bolsonaro militant George Washington de Oliveira Sousa, who was arrested on the Saturday before Christmas while preparing to blow up a truck full of fuel in the vicinity of Brasilia airport.
Another difference between the take-over of the Capitol and the Three Powers Plaza and its buildings is that the first was basically led by Trump, who was still in office, while the second one took place when Bolsonaro was in the US as a self-exile. Will this protect him from legal indictment, unlike what happened to his American role-model? It’s hard to tell at the moment, because the Brazilian former president encouraged the camps by not recognizing the results of the October 30 second round, but –contrary to Trump– didn’t spearhead any demonstration and actually condemned –although lightly– the acts of violence that broke out as soon as the vote count was over.
In any case, Bolsonaro must still face the courts in several proceedings, and these episodes will not make his situation easier.
Rebellion?
At first, observers pointed out the preventable nature of the invasion of this extremist horde and the striking impotence of the Brazilian military police, who were called on to intervene once the havoc had already been wrought. Did they fail to see it coming, trust that the hotspots of the resistance would fizzle out as the days passed – or was there, perhaps, complicity? If it’s the latter, is the army involved?
In one of the last acts of his mandate, the far-right president replaced the chief of the armed forces, Marco Antônio Freire Gomes, with general Julio César de Arruda. The former, a hardline Bolsonaro supporter, had refused not only to evict the camp outside the barracks in Brasilia, but also to obey the orders of the new government. The question remains: was rebellion among the military authorities limited to Freire Gomes alone, or was he just the most visible defender of a posture that includes more officials and forces?
One of the poisoned chalices Bolsonaro left Brazilian democracy was the re-politicization of the Armed Forces and security forces. During his mandate, around six thousand officers, both retired and active, passed through various government jobs, from junior positions to ministries, chief of cabinet, and even the vice-presidency. These sectors, who for decades have longed for a return to the protagonism the forces had in politics until redemocratization in 1985, won’t necessarily go quietly back to political ostracism.
The repression under Brazil’s last military regime was harsh, but not to the extent of its counterparts in Argentina, Chile and elsewhere. Likewise, its economic policies were developmentalist, distanced from the neoliberalism of Pinochet or Videla that bore such heavy social costs. These circumstances meant that the Armed Forces left power, if not with prestige, then at least stronger than others in South America, and that in the years that followed, they maintained considerable social weight.
The officials who for years developed strategies to recover a political role – even taking Bolsonaro, while he was a deputy, as an instrument that ultimately developed his own agenda – always insisted that their people had greater capacity to manage public affairs than a partidocracy beset by corruption.
That seed remains alive under the surface of Brazilian politics. The shocking events of the last hours are nothing but the geyser of the hot rivers that continue to flow underground without being noticed.
